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	<title>Cyber McCarthyism</title> 
	<subtitle>Witch Hunts in the Living Room</subtitle> 
	<abstract>
<p>Many people are uneasy with the rapid spread of new forms
	  of electronic communication and media such as the internet,
	  video on demand, electronic agents, teletorg numbers
	  (premium rate services), satellite TV, pay TV channels
	  accessible through cable TV, etc. Research has shown that
	  parents fear for their children's access to unsavory
	  information.  These developments have led to what one might
	  call a border crisis or a fear that the social norms defined
	  by traditional values are being rapidly changed.  This paper
	  examines the potential for electronic communication to spark
	  mass hate such as that seen in colonial Salem and during the
	  McCarthy period.  As developed here, mass hate is a form of
	  social hysteria characterized by a socially stressful
	  situation, individuals or institutions available for
	  vilification, a crystallizing event and the neutralization
	  of societies normal control mechanisms.  After outlining the
	  sequence of elements which are necessary for the development
	  of mass hate, I examine two historical
	  examples. Difficulties in identifying villains and the
	  ability to handle these situations administratively, and not
	  the least, social support for the development of electronic
	  communication may mitigate the potential for the development
	  of mass hate.
</p>
	</abstract>
	<availability status="free">Copyright 1996 Electronic Journal of Sociology</availability>
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      <author>
	<name>
	  <first>Richard</first>
	  <last>Ling</last>
	</name>
	<address>
	  <email>richard.ling@gou.telenor.no</email>
	  <organisation>Telenor Research and Development</organisation>
	</address>
</author>
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        <title>Electronic Journal of Sociology</title>
	<idno type="issn">1198 3655</idno>
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	<name><full>Athabasca University</full></name>
	<address><street>1 University Drive</street><city>Athabasca</city>
	  <province>Alberta</province><postalcode>SOG OWO</postalcode>
	  <email>mikes@athabascau.ca</email>
	</address>
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	<date><year>1996</year></date>                 
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<h2>Introduction</h2>

<p>In early 1692 a minister Lawsen visited his colleague Reverend Samuel
Parris to investigate rumours of witchcraft in Salem Village,
Massachusetts.  Based on that visit he wrote the following
description:</p>

<blockquote>I went to give Mr.  Parris a visit.  When I was there,
his kinswoman, Abigail Williams, (about 12 years of age,) [sic] had a
grievous fit; <i>she was at first hurried with violence to and fro in
the room,</i> (though Mrs.  Intersoll endeavoured to hold her,) [sic]
sometimes making as if she would fly, stretching her arms up as high
as she could, and crying&quot; whish, whish, whish!&quot; several
times....  After that, she run to the fire, and began to throw
fire brands about the house; and run against the  back, as if she
would run up the chimney, and as they said, she had attempted to go
into the fire in other fits (Lawsen quoted in Erikson,  1966: 142.
Emphasis added).</blockquote>
<p>The&quot; cause&quot; of this behaviour was alleged to be a Black
Barbadian cook named Tituba.  She was said to have familiarity with
various types of magic and voodoo.</p>

<p>Almost three hundred years later a student at a fundamentalist
Christian high school, Bethany Baptist Academy, described the
attitude of the school towards rock music as follows:&quot; rock
music gets you in a rowdy spirit and then you'll go out and do things
you shouldn't do...rock music tears the Lord down&quot; 
(Peshkin, 1988: 251).  Another student, the senior class president
said:</p>

<blockquote>Personally, I think rock and roll is repulsive.  I
wouldn't want to listen to it.  I've heard it and I don't like it. 
<i>I've heard stories about what it makes you do.</i>If you listen
to rock music, then you get rowdy and go out and vandalize and stuff.
 And rock music goes along with the drug parties; it gets you in the
mood (Peshkin, 1988: 200. Emphasis added).</blockquote>

<p>In both cases there is the assertion that external forces are at
work.  It is the music which initiates the rowdiness and&quot; makes
you do&quot; vandalism and attend drug parties and perhaps even
engage in satanistic ceremonies (O'Sullivan, 1991).  In a parallel
construction one may note that Abigail Williams&quot; was hurried
with violence to and fro in the room.&quot;</p>

<p>In both cases syntax suggests that the victim is overtaken by
forces outside their control and in both cases the effect is an
affront to God worthy of expulsion from the community.   <endnotenumber>1</endnotenumber></p>

<p>As with the cases cited above, it is not hard to tap into an
uneasiness about the rapid spread of new forms of electronic
communication and media, i.e.  the Internet, video on demand,
electronic agents, premium rate services, satellite TV, pay TV
channels accessible through cable TV, etc.  This is true when it
comes to parents' fears for their children and particularly true when
children are more computer literate than their parents.  While large
portions of the society understand and are comfortable with various
types of electronic media, many actively avoid them and many fear
their effects.  Studies have reported that there is fear that media
can control the minds of children (Peshkin, 1988: 258).  Norwegian
parents expressed fears that media leads to over stimulation and
uneasiness in children's bodies.  They feared easy access to
unsavoury material and the development of what one respondent called
&quot;the American situation.&quot;  <endnotenumber>2</endnotenumber>
</p>

<p>This paper examines the potential for electronic communication to
spark mass hate, such as that seen in colonial Salem.  The speed with
which electronic media has developed has left many uneasy.  This
development has also led to what one might call a border crisis or 
a fear that the social norms defined by traditional values are
being rapidly changed.</p>

<p>New media has given us access to things which were difficult in a
print based world (Meyorwitz, 1986; McLuhan,  1994).  Many parents
are left with the sense that they are unable to control the types of
information to which their children have access.  Like the fears
concerning the voodoo and witchcraft of Tituba, many feel that media
have the ability to infiltrate their homes with images and messages
which are both malicious and dangerous.  Another aspect which lends a
particular power to the fear of electronic media is that both the
content and the medium can be seen as undermining the authority of
the parents.  It is not bad enough that there is open and frank
information about sexuality, drugs and violence.  In addition,
children can find it on their own and bring it into the home using
technology of which parents have only a vague understanding.</p>

<p>In this paper I speculate as to the potential for electronic
communication to spark an episode of mass hate.  As developed here,
mass hate is a form of social hysteria characterized by a socially
stressful situation, individuals or institutions available for
vilification, a crystallizing event and the neutralization of
societies normal control mechanisms.  After outlining the sequence of
elements which are necessary for the development of mass hate, I 
examine two historical examples and then speculate as to the
potential for the development of a cyber based mass hate.  Is it
possible that the confluence of rapidly developing electronic
communication with the fear of the media's effect can result in a
form of mass hysteria or cyber McCarthyism?  The fact that it is
difficult to identify a villain and the fact that such conflicts have
been successfully handled by existing institutions may indicate that
the danger is not critical.</p>

<h2>The sociological basis for mass hate</h2>

<p>The elements which go into the development of mass hate include the 
following: 1)
strains on the community through the recognition of a moral boundary
crisis and identification of villains, 2) crystallizing of patterned
labelling through a degradation ceremony, 3) appropriation of the
social apparatus and suppression of critique mechanisms, 4)
restoration of a normal situation.  This sequence can be found in a
variety of situations ranging from the search for witches in colonial
Massachusetts to the ganging up on Chicanos in wartime California to
the persecution of the Hollywood 10 in the McCarthy era.  The
elements which link these events are the moral indignation of the
community made manifest through patterned labelling (Doyle, 1988).</p>

<h2>General recognition of a boundary crisis and villain
identification</h2>

<p>The primary condition for the emergence of  mass hatred is a socially
stressful situation.  This is particularly true if there is the
perception of a threat to the moral boundaries of the community
(Erikson, 1966: 68; Wright, 1965: 288).  Social stresses may arise
from wars, threats to governance, and perceived shifts in authority
or control.  In addition technical developments can lead to a
boundary crises.  This is illuminated by Eisenstein's study of the
social effects of printing (1991).  On the one hand the Catholic
church was empowered by the technology.  They could, for example
quickly spread exact messages to the far flung corners of the
Catholic world in Latin so that only those who could read Latin were
able to decode the messages.  On the other hand there was the
development of  Luther and the Protestant movement that was largely
based on the printing press.</p>

<p>The second element which facilitates the development of boundary
crises is the existence of concrete groups available for
vilification.  Klapp (1971) discusses the need, in the case of social
unrest, to identify a specific type of person or group who will fit
the specific need for a scapegoat (see also Lofland 1981: 434). 
There may be a simple visual element, i.e.  persons of different skin
colour or dress.  However, membership in organizations or
participation in certain types of activities can also be used as a
basis for vilification.  Note that not just any villain will do. 
This person or group, if they are to fulfil their role in the social
drama must be seen as a powerful adversary who, if unchecked, will
pose a threat to society.</p>

<blockquote>A poor, witless, bedraggled devil in a struggle against a
powerful majestic god makes the god ridiculous.  A strong, cunning,
and powerful devil enhances the power of God.  Like any villain, he
must be almost equal to the hero if the hero is to gain honour in
vanquishing him (Duncan, 1970: 342).</blockquote>
<h2>Patterned labelling and crystallizing degradation
ceremonies</h2>

<p>Recognition of a boundary crisis and the availability of a vilifiable
group are necessary for the development of mass hysteria.  To develop
into mass hate, however, there must be a socially recognized ritual
which makes the crisis tangible and which clarifies the social roles
of the various actors.  In this connection I use the term patterned
labelling, which is an adaptation of the labelling theory of deviance
developed by Lemert (1951; 1967) and Becker (1963; see also
Chambliss,  1973 and Garfinkle, 1956).
While many approaches to the study of deviance search for the genesis
of deviance in psychological, systemic or even physiological
irregularities, labelling theory examines the symbolic interaction
between society and the individual.  Deviance is a combination of the
individuals' behaviour and societies' reaction to that behaviour.  A
social effect of deviance is that it helps society to define its own
sense of propriety.</p>

<blockquote>Deviancy is not a simple kind of leakage which occurs
when the machinery of society is in poor working order, but may be,
in controlled quantities, an important condition for preserving the
stability of social life.  Deviant forms of behaviour, by marking the
outer edges of group life, give the inner structure its special
character and thus supply the framework within which the people of
the group develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity
(Erikson, 1966: 13).</blockquote>

<p>The social function of labelling people as deviant is
identification of the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate
behaviour.  There are three phases in the labelling process.  These
are primary deviance, a degradation ceremony and secondary deviance. 
Primary deviance is that type of deviance carried on by many members
of society.  The individual may engage in various acts which, if
known in the proper social context, would be considered deviant. 
However, since they are not made public there is no social reaction. 
Examples include the local store keeper who takes questionable tax
deductions, the teenager who engages in experimental homosexual
activity, the spraying of graffiti, and the use of illicit drugs.</p>

<p>Upon public recognition of primary deviance in the community the
person may be subjected to what Garfinkle (1956) calls a degradation
ceremony.  The ceremony is a public act carried out by significant
members of the community (e.g.   judges, police, teachers, members of
the military, priests).  The accused is publicly punished and forced
to recognize the moral superiority of the accusers.  In addition to
its disciplinary function, the ceremony labels the accused of being a
&quot;tax cheater&quot;&quot; nut,&quot;&quot; whore,&quot;
&quot;fag,&quot; or&quot; addict&quot; in the popular imagination, or
perhaps more importantly in their estimation of the popular
imagination.  It is important to underscore that labelling does not
necessarily consider the actual guilt or innocence of the individual. 
Rather it refers to their status in the society.</p>

<blockquote>The community's decision to bring deviant sanctions
against one of its members is not a simple act of censure.  It is an
intricate rite of transition, at once moving the individual out of
his (sic) ordinary place in society and transferring him into a
special deviant position.  The ceremonies which mark this change of
status, generally, have a number of related phases.  They supply a
formal stage on which the deviant and his community can confront one
another (as in the criminal trial); they make an announcement about
the nature of his deviancy (a verdict or diagnosis, for example); and
they place him in a particular role which is thought to neutralize
the harmful effects of his misconduct (like the role of a prisoner or
patient).  These commitment ceremonies tend to be occasions of wide
public interest and ordinarily take place in a highly dramatic
setting.  Perhaps the most obvious example of a commitment ceremony
is the criminal trial, with its elaborate formality and exaggerated
ritual, but more modest equivalents can be found wherever procedures
are set up to judge whether or not someone is legitimately deviant 
<endnotenumber>3</endnotenumber>  (Erikson, 1966: 16).</blockquote>


<p>The label becomes a self fulfilling prophesy.  The accused can no
longer claim the status of&quot; normal&quot; individual.  Rather,
they must accept the status of a deviant.  With access to normal
society restricted, the accused must seek companionship among those
who are not so harsh in their judgment.  The teen who has
experimented with drugs will find acceptance among those who also
have accepted the status of drug users and the nascent graffiti
artists will adopt the morals of like fellows.  Upon acceptance of
this status, the individual will be open to the behaviour of the
defining group which is deviant vis-&Agrave;-vis the larger society. 
Labelling theory calls this portion of the cycle secondary
deviance.</p>

<p>In the case of mass hate, the process of labelling is generalized to
an entire group.  Against the backdrop of widely recognized social
stress and with a group available for scapegoating, the missing
element is a ritual that will fix the social polarization in the
situation (Oberschall, 1973).</p>

<p>As with individual labelling, the process of patterned labelling
includes primary behaviour which, when seen against the backdrop of
the broader social strain, leads to degradation ceremonies.  The
&quot;primary deviance&quot;  in the case of patterned labelling may
be activities which are accepted in less stressful times as
relatively innocent, i.e.  minor excesses of youth, the recitation of
fairy tales from exotic cultures, critical social commentary or
various types of political activity.  However, if the conditions of
strain are correctly aligned a simple action may be the carthesis for
a crisis (Hall et al., 1979: 221).  This is what I refer to as the
crystallizing degradation ceremony.  In this process, the specific
behaviour of the&quot; deviant&quot; becomes abstracted and thus,
easily applied to other questionable members of the community.</p>

<h2>Appropriation of the social apparatus, suppression of critique
mechanisms and restoration of the
&quot;normal&quot; situation</h2>

<p>If patterned labelling exceeds the ability of the community's
discipline apparatus, i.e.  police, courts, it is likely that these
institutions will be appropriated and social critique limited.  Those
who question the process will be judged as having questionable
loyalty to the community and will be considered a threat to the moral
boundaries of the society.  This is, in effect, a reign of ideology
where only the&quot; true believers&quot; are safe from persecution
(and sometimes not even that!) The urge is to purge the community of
the evil spectre.  There is a&quot; us&quot; against&quot; them&quot;
mentality which dominates and it becomes the duty of all to root out
the villain.</p>

<p>In this process the members of the community become experts at
identification of the morally suspect.  Those displaying certain
types of jewellery, clothing, dialects, skin colour, those who are
members in certain organizations or movements, or those expressing
certain ideas are vulnerable to labelling.  The definition of
deviance may develop and change as the crisis continues and the
&quot;true believers&quot; become more adept at recognizing the
nuances of deviance.</p>

<p>The process of vilification proceeds until either a plausible gap
in the proceedings is generally recognized and/or until the process
threatens significantly powerful members of the community who have
the resources to alter the progression of guilt by vilification.</p>

<h2>Two examples of mass hate</h2>

<p>To flesh out the social background for mass hysteria, it is useful
to examine two concrete examples.  These are the witch hunt in
colonial Salem, Massachusetts and the case of the Hollywood 10.  In
both cases, the events took place against a backdrop of a boundary
crisis.  Villains were identified and degraded in a ceremony which
crystallizes the issues troubling the community.   <endnotenumber>4</endnotenumber></p>

<h2>Case one: The witch hunt in colonial Salem, Massachusetts</h2>

<p>The Massachusetts colony was established with the intention of
becoming a perfect religious society.  The colony was to be the new
Kingdom of God, the&quot; city on the hill,&quot; a&quot; light in
darkness&quot; (Drinnon, 1990; 0Bi:  Winthrop, 1989; 22).  According
to Erikson, Puritanism was more than simply a religion for the early
members of the Colony.  It was&quot; an emotional tone as well as a
body of theory, an ideological stance as well as a political
program&quot; (1966, 44; see also Hall 1989, 21; Garraty and Gay,
1984: 665-668; Nesbit, 1973: 211, 215-216; Stone, 1977: 175).</p>

<p>As one might guess, it is not easy to maintain religious fervour. 
Such movements are faced with the need to institutionalize charisma
in an attempt to maintain its authority (Weber 1978: 246-254; 
Schweitzer, 1984).  In the real world people assert their
independence and question authority.  Unforeseen issues arise and
clay feet become obvious where before there was only a head of gold. 
Between the 1660's and the 1690's the colony suffered a series of
reversals that led to the end of the most active expression of the
faith of the community.   <endnotenumber>5</endnotenumber>  From the
perspective of the community members it must have seemed as though
all that which they had worked for was under direct attack from the
devil.  The moral landscape, in the words of Cotton Mather had become
&quot;fill'd with Fiery flying serpents....  All our way to
Heaven, lies by the Dens of Lions, and the Mounts of Leopards;  there
are incredible Droves of Devils in our way&quot; (Mather cited in
Erikson, 1966: 141).  By the 1690's a boundary crisis had developed. 
The Puritans must have been faced with the recognition that their
Kingdom of God was in the process of becoming profane.  This was most
likely a difficult realization, prompting rearguard actions such as
the infamous Salem witch episode of 1692.</p>

<p>The villain was first seen to be the Black slave Tituba around
whom several girls from Salem Village, Massachusetts began to
collect.  Tituba,  the cook in the home of the Reverend Parris, was
born and raised in the Barbados and was undoubtedly familiar with the
rich legends and voodoo of the Caribbean which contrasted so sharply
with the spartan pietism of the Puritans (Erikson, 1966: 141-145,
Encyclopedia Americana, 1989: 147; Lawson, 1914; Starkey, 1949;
Drinnon, 1990).</p>

<p>As time progressed the bond between the girls intensified and they
shared strictly guarded secrets.  Soon, the girls began to display
extraordinary fits where they would scream, convulse and grovel on
the ground.  The town's doctor was called but was unable to effect a
cure.  His conclusion was that the fits were the result of
metaphysical causes, and thus outside the realm of his competence. 
The local clergy were called to deal with the situation.  They
determined that the girls had been bewitched.   <endnotenumber>6</endnotenumber>   The only solution was for the girls to identify
the witches who were harassing them.  The girls, with coaching from
the local elders, identified three witches.  They included Tituba,
Sarah Good, a poor local woman who was known for begging, uttering
oaths against those who crossed her, smoking a pipe and not taking
care of her children,  and Sarah Osburne who had been the brunt of a
scandal wherein a man had moved into her house several months before
becoming her husband.</p>

<p>The crystallizing degradation ceremony of these three women came
at the trial where one can see the public labelling of vilified
individuals, i.e.  non-traditional women, against the backdrop of a
stressful social setting.  The&quot; bewitched&quot; girls rolled
around on the floor, pointed at invisible spirits who flew around the
court room, and generally disturbed the proceedings.  Sarah Good and
Sarah Osburne were more or less speechless during the proceeding.  By
contrast, Tituba gave a full and colourful recitation on the
creatures who inhabit the spiritual plane.  She told the judges of
the dark rituals which bind these Satanistic spirits and in general
gave the court and the public more than they bargained for.  In
addition to giving them an overview of her spiritual constitution,
Tituba implicated Sarah Good, Sarah Osburn and many other local
residents.</p>

<p>Tituba's confession galvanized the community.  The Salem witch
hysteria was in full swing.  The&quot; bewitched&quot; girls became
recognized as divining rods who were able to point to other witches,
both male and female.  By this point the institutions of social
control had been overwhelmed.</p>

<p>As the girls began to implicate persons higher and higher on the
social ladder, i.e., the wife of the Governor, the president of
Harvard College and Cotton Mather's mother, Captain John Alden and
Nathaniel Carey, questions as to the validity of their activity began
to arise (Erikson, 1966: 149-50).  This prompted a shift in the legal
definition of witchcraft.  In turn, the framework upon which the
panic had been built began to crumble.  Soon after these doubts arose
the hysteria lost its power and the remaining suspects were released
from jail.  In the end, 19&quot; witches&quot; died either from
hanging, being crushed with stones or from disease in prison.</p>

<h2>Case two: The Hollywood 10</h2>

<p>A second example of mass hate, an example that deals with mass hate
in the context of media, is that of the Hollywood 10 and the
&quot;threat&quot; posed by communism in the decade immediately
following World War II.  Those who were vilified had access to a mass
media.  It was felt that they used this access to spread a
potentially dangerous message and subvert the morality of the
community.  Those who were labelled as deviants were not selected on
the basis of their appearance or dress.  Rather, they were identified
by an official investigation based on the recommendation of
informants.</p>

<p>Through the early 40's there had been a series of measures taken
in order to protect the US against the perceived threat of Communism.
 President Roosevelt had instituted a system of loyalty checks to
insure that the government would not be infiltrated.  By the late
40's this had become an issue of popular concern, that is a boundary
crisis.  There was social stress based on the fall of China to Mao
and the fear that the Soviets were able to develop atomic
weapons.</p>

<blockquote>Most citizens of the United States went into the Second
World War very conscious of the line separating&quot; democracy&quot;
from&quot; fascism,&quot; since this distinction represented one of
the critical baselines of the American way;  but these same citizens
emerged from the war into a world where the line separating
&quot;democracy&quot; from&quot; communism&quot; had assumed a sudden
prominence.  This change of focus did not indicate the appearance of
&quot;new&quot; boundaries, of course, but a shift of national
attention from one established boundary sector to another, and the
various investigations which followed during the McCarthy era can be
understood to some extent as an attempt on the part of the larger
community to become better informed about the nature and location of
that line (Erikson, 1966: 70).</blockquote>

<p>As with the Puritans and witchcraft, communism was perceived to be
a critical boundary issue.  The response to this threat was to vilify
sectors of the community who gave the impression of sympathy with
this ideology (Current, Williams and Freidel, 1971: 731). <endnotenumber>7</endnotenumber>   In 1947 the US Congress' House
Committee on Un-American Activities held a series of hearings focused
on eliminating the&quot; communist menace&quot; from the film
industry; (Dick, 1989; Jensen, 1971-72).  The committee, with the
help of several sources in the industry, including Walt Disney and
Ronald Reagan, identified 10 writers and actors who were thought to
have connections to communist organizations.</p>

<p>The individuals who became the&quot; Hollywood 10&quot; refused to
cooperate with the investigation at a nationally covered hearing. 
They invoked their right to avoid self-incrimination and thus, in the
popular imagination, they were seen as trying to hide misdeeds.  This
was the crystallizing degradation ceremony.  The 10 lost their jobs
and sparked the hunt for more communists in the film industry.  In
the end more than 200 individuals were placed on a blacklist thus
losing their jobs.  Several hundred were also placed on a gray list
for their political activities and also lost their jobs (Dick,
1989).</p>

<p>Like the Salem witch hunt, the McCarthy period waned as
accusations of communist sympathy began to effect persons and
organizations with high status and legitimacy.  It is generally
recognized that the end came when Senator McCarthy held hearings
focused on finding communist sympathizers in the Army.  During these
hearings he made a series of reckless accusations.  At the same time,
it was discovered that  McCarthy and his counsel Ray Cohen had sought
favours from the military.  This revelation had the effect of
unmasking him (McLellen, 1989: 557).  The fact that the Army was
considered to be nearly holy in the period immediately after World
War II meant that McCarthy was unable to pursue his attack (Mills,
1976).  He was subsequently censured by the Senate, the strongest
discipline short of excluding a member.</p>

<h2>Similarities and differences</h2>

<p>In both cases the elements leading to mass hate were in place. 
Boundary crises were evident and persons became available for
vilification.  A crystallizing degradation ceremony took place during
which the general anxieties were given a concrete face.  In both
cases there developed a mass hysteria that outstripped, and in turn
cooped the authorities.  Finally, the fervour came under control.  In
both of these cases this occurred when the mass hate became a serious
threat to the established power structure, members of the government
in the case of colonial Salem and the Army in the case of
McCarthyism.</p>

<p>There are, however, differences between these two cases.  First
the social context is quite different for the two.  Colonial
Massachusetts was a tightly controlled religiously dominated society.
 It was not the polycultural society in which the McCarthy episode
took place.  In this respect it was perhaps easier for the threat to
gain a foothold in the society.  In addition, this may have
facilitated more the use of extreme measures to eliminate the threat.
 A second difference is that the villains were, perhaps, more obvious
in the Salem episode.  Because of the local nature of the community
it may have been easier for members of the society to recognize
suspicious individuals.  A third difference is seen in the role of
mass media.  An integral aspect of the crystallizing degradation
ceremony in the McCarthy episode was the televised broadcasting of
the hearings.  This made the ten individuals who refused to comply
easily identifiable.  It, in effect, collapsed the vilification and
the degradation ceremony into a single act.  I will now turn to a
discussion of the potential for an episode of mass hate based on the
development of electronic communication.</p>

<h2>The potential for Cyber McCarthyism</h2>

<p>Many of the elements associated with the cases presented above can be
found in the social reaction to the development of electronic
communication.  The new electronic situation means that all members
of society can potentially become the authors or the consumers of
information that others feel is immoral.  The fact that it can come
or be sent via the Internet, and can contain text, pictures, sound
and video material means that comprehensive communication is
possible.  Not only can one be the recipient of this material but one
can also be its author with a potential world wide audience.</p>

<p>None the less, the development of cyber based episodes of mass
hate is dependent on the degree to which these messages become the
basis of a boundary crisis.  In this section I will consider the
degree to which electronic media represent a boundary crisis and
speculate as to the potential for the development of mass hatred
based on the development of new media.</p>

<h2>Boundary crises and electronic media</h2>

<p>New communication technology has led to a series of major changes in
our lives.  Many commentators suggest that we have entered a new
epoch.  There is the idea that we live in an information based
society.  If this line of reasoning is to be believed this will lead
to fundamental changes in our relations to work, to education, to the
church and to the family.  Many have suggested that this development
is the most basic change to the organization of society since the
industrial revolution.</p>

<blockquote>The information society, according to its proponents,
brings about change at the most fundamental level of society.  It
initiates a new mode of production.  It changes the very source of
wealth-creation and the governing factors in production.  Labour and
capital, the central factors of the industrial society, are replaced
by information and knowledge as central variables (Kumar, 1995:
12).</blockquote>
<p>Such changes are not to be taken lightly.  Just as the industrial
revolution was the spark that led to modernization, it also had
fundamental effects on the lives of individuals and was the point of
departure for many of the social conflicts of the 19th and 20th
century.  If the information revolution is the fundamental transition
described by many, then one can also expect the same intensity of
conflicts.</p>

<p>To bring this discussion down from the abstract, the development
of  information technology raises the issue of socialization.  In
material from a series of focus group interviews in Norway examining
new media many respondents voiced as a common criticism of the
technology its ability to effect children.   <endnotenumber>8</endnotenumber>   Many parents feel a lack of control when
confronted with the explosion of possibilities made available through
electronic media.  For example, a mother talked about&quot; that
gigantic attack that our children are experiencing.&quot;  She felt
that the access to various media&quot; means that they are much more
vulnerable.&quot;</p>

<p>This&quot; attack&quot; is the result of electronic media's 
ability to penetrate one's home with messages and information that
conflicts with one's sense of morality.  In a print based world it is
easier to exclude inappropriate information from certain social
situations.  Physical and moral boundaries are easier to maintain
(Meyrowitz, 1986).  By comparison, it is more difficult to keep one's
children from coming into contact with recipes for LSD, films showing
pediophilia, necrophilia or Christ making love to Mary Magdalene,
satanistic messages&quot; backmasked&quot; into hard metal music,
images of art consisting of jars filled with crucifixes and urine and
vulgar&quot; flame wars&quot; with electronic media.  According to a
study by Rimm, there are over 900,000&quot; pornographic&quot; pages
available on the Internet.  These range from simple nudity to various
forms of  people having sex to other more explicit and deviant forms
of interaction.  According to Rimm these pictures have been accessed
over 8 million times (Rimm, 1995; Fox, 1994).  Regardless of the
rigor of such analysis this type of assertion is swallowed whole by
those who are worried about the development of these
technologies.</p>

<p>While many parents see this type of openness as a threat, the
access to information has also been hailed as a revolution by the so
called cyber punk ideology.  This approach suggests the new openness
will tear down the facades that have been used to cover our
&quot;true&quot; feelings.  The journalist R.U.  Sirius (1994) writes
that:</p>

<blockquote>Media space-and now virtual space-must be thought of and
used as a safe zone, where all of the demons and ghouls of the
imagination can act out....  Out in the real (meat) world, it
can be generalized that people behave in a superficially civil manner
towards one and another, but brutalize one and other over the
&quot;bottom line,&quot;  when possession or survival is at stake. 
In a fully realized media or cyber culture-at the point where primary
value is located in virtual space-this may be reversed.  People may
play the most primitive of games inside the fully realized media
landscape while providing for common decency on the social and
economic level.</blockquote>

<p>The transition from a print to an electronic world is the cause of
concern (Cohen, 1980; Knutsson, 1989: 5-6; O'Sullivan, 1991; von
Feilitzen, 1993: 11-13).  This is particularly true for parents who
are not computer literate.  In a print based world, it is easier to
hold one's home free of these influences.   <endnotenumber>9</endnotenumber>   Focus group participants in Norway felt that the
new media was dangerous vis-&Agrave;-vis children.  These media are
particularly troubling since one is not able to keep their children
from seeing thing which they feel are inappropriate.  One parent
said:</p>

<blockquote>It is one thing to be an adult and have the ability to
differentiate between that which is important and that which is not
important.  But children, small children, can not
differentiate.</blockquote>

<p>Similar fears were expressed by other parents.  Violent games can
&quot;hook&quot; children, keep them from doing their lessons, result
in headaches and make them drowsy the next day in school.  TV is
&quot;not exactly textbook education.&quot;  There is a fear that too
many&quot; strange things&quot; come in through a cable subscription
and that violent films lead to a violent society.</p>

<p>While there was general agreement among the respondents as to the
reality of the&quot; attack&quot; to which children were subjected,
there was little agreement as to its symptoms nor its effects.  A
woman in her 50's felt that because of media&quot; [Children] are
over stimulated.  It develops a type of restlessness.  When it is
quiet they are restless and there is an uneasiness in their
bodies.&quot;  A second woman said:</p>

<blockquote>I have a son... who does not like it when it is
quiet.  He has either the radio, or music or the TV on.  I like it
sometimes when it is quiet.  This is something with children.  They
like to have that sound all the time and I think that it is very
negative....</blockquote>

<p>Another symptom of over exposure to TV, according to the
respondents, is that children become passive.  This comment comes
from a mother in her 40's who said that TV:</p>

<blockquote>...is like dope, the dope they get from TV.  The
influence that is a passive influence.  They have not developed the
ability to understand it.  They take everything in the same way and
there is no activity.  There is no mental development.</blockquote>

<p>While many of the respondents felt that it was wrong that
&quot;these types of services come into the individual homes&quot;
there was disagreement on how to deal with the situation.  On the one
hand many respondents felt that the authorities should take
responsibility.  Many felt that the sender should control the
content.  When referring to a telephone based video on demand system
respondents noted that&quot; Televerket (now Telenor) needs to be a
little selective in what they choose.  We do not want the American
situation in Norway.  Norway is a little country&quot; and Telenor
should&quot; have control over the system.&quot;</p>

<p>A possible solution to the access problem can be provided by the
use of PIN codes.  Various members of the family would have
differential access to information in certain types of media.  While
it is possible to use PIN codes, the respondents felt that this was
less than an ideal situation.  On the one hand PIN codes are not
completely secure.</p>

<blockquote>In spite of the PIN codes, people might be able to come
in there in some way or other.  You can risk that children see the
&quot;Chain saw massacre&quot; or what ever.  That should not be
possible.</blockquote>

<p>Another perspective was provided by an elderly man who felt that
it was wrong to rely on technology to mediate between family members.
 The family should be the reserve of trust and mutual respect in
society.  To impose systems of PIN codes and differential access
contrasted with his image of how a household should function.  He
said: &quot; With a family, I don't know....  [It should be
that] with children that you do not need a secret code.  It is coming
of course.&quot;</p>

<h2>Patterned labelling and crystallization of the
crisis</h2>

<p>Given the potential for a boundary crises associated with modern
technology, one might assume that the&quot; primary deviance&quot; is
in the process of becoming more public.  Behaviours which were once
seen with tolerance in society are being seen with different eyes. 
The lack of control over information which comes into one's home has
sparked several controversies in this respect.  In this section I
will look at how society has reacted, examine the potential for
patterned labelling and speculate as to the nature of a potential
crystallizing degradation ceremony.
The episode in Salem indicates that the potential for patterned
labelling vis-&Agrave;-vis electronic communication is strongest in
communities with a well defined hierarchy and strongly defined moral
values.  Thus one can suggest that contemporary fundamentalist and
authoritarian groups will be among the first to both define
&quot;cyber&quot; activities as more than primary deviance and also
to proceed in the vilification of persons and/or groups (Johnson,
1995; Eidsv&aring;g, 1995).   <endnotenumber>10</endnotenumber>   Many
forms of mass media are already seen as being morally suspect.  For
example, in his study of a fundamentalist Christian high school 
Peshkin found that seeing a film, any film, is an offense that can
also lead to the student's expulsion (Peshkin, 1988).  Viewing
inappropriate TV programs or listening to rock music are also taboo.</p>

<p>In the context of this paper, the student discipline process at
such a school is an example of labelling.  When this process takes
place against a charged social context and if a group is available
for vilification there is the potential for mass hate.</p>

<h2>Crystallizing degradation ceremony</h2>

<p>There have been several events, in the recent past,  which could be
crystallizing degradation ceremonies for mass.  Examples include what
was conceived of as the media motivated kidnapping and murder of two
year old James Bulger in England and a somewhat similar episode
involving a five year old girl in Trondheim, Norway.  The press has
also reported suicides and killings which, given the correct social
context, i.e.  social stress and a recognizable villain, could become
crystallizing degradation ceremonies (Skreting, 1994). <endnotenumber>11</endnotenumber></p>

<p>In both the cases cited above the persons who carried out the
killings were youths.  In the former they were 10 and 11 year old
boys and in the latter case they were both five year olds.  Both
cases are examples of moral and ethical dilemmas in that they cry out
to the humanity of the observer.  To understand the tragedy of an
innocent child's death is impossible.  One wants to know why this
happened.  Even though the observer never met the dead children, they
feel an empathy with them and their parents.  It is that visceral
feeling that can easily be cooped and reformed into vilification if
the appropriate deviant is symbolically available (Hall et al 1979:
220).</p>

<p>With the case in England, and to a lesser degree that in Norway,
direct connections were made between the motives for the killings and
specific programs or films (Skretting, 1994).  In England there was a
connection made to the film <i>Child's Play 3.</i>Further analysis
of the situation in England showed that the connections were not as
dramatic as originally reported.  None the less, in the popular
imagination, the connections are clear.  This is shown in the
comments of a male participant in a focus group held in Norway.</p>

<blockquote>[Film and TV] leads to a more violent society.  There is
no doubt about that.  You can see it in terms of that child in
England.  That was a copy of a film.  <i>It has been proven that
violence leads to violence.</i>It is the same with other extreme
films. (emphasis added)</blockquote>

<p>In spite of the fact that researchers have found only indirect
connections between violence and media, the public understanding of
the connection is clear and solid.  There is no nuance.  Violence
leads to violence.  This perspective is also reflected by the
Norwegian Minister of Culture who stated that&quot; There is no known
connection between increasing violence in visual material and
violence in society.  None the less, we assume that it is to be
found&quot; (Ellingsen, 1995).</p>

<p>These instances have the potential of becoming crystallizing
ceremonies.  <endnotenumber>12</endnotenumber>  However, these are
not as incendiary as they might be since no group is directly
available for vilification.  Because of this it was not possible to
carry out a crystallizing degradation ceremony.  The transgressions
are seen as an unfortunate aspect of new technology and ot as a
fundamental threat to society.  In order to develop into mass hate
there is the need for a public drama wherein a clearly defined group
is judged in the popular imagination and convicted of a
transgression.</p>

<p>The children who carried out the killings were minors who are
judged to be easily affected by the films and TV to which they are
subjected.  In the popular imagination, the true
&quot;offenders&quot; are the persons who provided the children with
the material.  These persons are not easily available, none the less
activities in that direction were carried out.  For example Skretting
(1994: 144) notes that:</p>

<blockquote>Critical attention was directed toward the shelves of the
video rental stores.  The newspapers asked: Is it also possible to
find the dangerous film <i>Child's Play 3</i>in our [Norwegian]
cities or villages?  The film was found in the video stores in
Romsdalen, Nes, Alta in addition to several other
places.</blockquote>

<p>As in the McCarthy period, if electronic media is seen to pose a
significant social threat, episodes like those in England and
Trondheim will lead to vilification and retribution directed at video
stores, bulletin board operators, film producers and other similar
groups.</p>

<h2>Mitigating elements</h2>

<p>While there is the potential for the development of cyber-based
episodes of mass hate, there are also mitigating elements.  Generally
these can be seen in the debate surrounding the development of an
information society.  Following authors such as Bell (1973),  McLuhan
(1994) and Meyrowitz (1994) we are in the process of going over from
an industrial society to what they call a post-industrial, or an
information society.  At the same time other authors suggest that the
development of advanced information systems is simply the further
extension of capital based rationalization into the domestic sphere
(Kumar, 1995; Rasmussen, 1995: 55).  If this latter perspective is
adopted it means that there is a broad agreement among social elites
as to the necessity of the innovation and while it has some
undesirable effects, these are not to be taken seriously since the
ultimate goal is the extension of the rationalized consumption.</p>

<blockquote>The reshaping of consumption, according to the principles
of what has been called&quot; social Taylorism&quot; (Webster and
Robins, 1989), also follows the familiar logic of capitalism.  That
is, it is concerned with bringing ever more areas of social and
cultural life within the purview of capitalist activity and market
rationality (Kumar, 1995: 155).</blockquote>

<p>If one follows this line of thought, the conceptions of the
cyber-based societies discussed by Nasbitt (1984), Toffler (1981),
and most recently Negroponte (1995) are off base.  The ideas of a new
Aquarius are simply  ideological lubrication for an ever more
encompassing control over the production and consumption cycle.  In
terms of the discussion here this means that the issue of mass hate
will be held in check until and if the technology begins to threaten
the power structure of society.  It  is only then that one might
expect a different structural response.</p>

<p>An interesting comparison can be made to the introduction of the
automobile.  The major effect has been a more efficient commerce
based on the cheap transportation of goods and services over a
publicly subsidized network of roads.  There have been certain
unfortunate side effects, i.e.  drunken driving, air pollution,
changes in courting behaviour, easier distribution of drugs, changes
in the form and extent of prostitution etc.  In addition the car has
changed both the structure of working and the geography of urban
development.  Nonetheless, the development of the automobile and
highway system has not provided the motivation for mass hate.  That
is, the car has not provided an ideological threat to the existing
power structure.  Rather, it has facilitated and extended it.</p>

<p>It is perhaps too early to tell if electronic communication
technology will prove to be a fundamental threat to the existing
power structure or simply be an extension of capitalist production. 
If the former proves to be dominant one can expect episodes of social
turbulence and mass hate as described in this paper.</p>

<h2>Conclusion</h2>

<p>This paper has presented a model for the development of mass hate. 
The process is described as including social strains due to a moral
boundary crisis, vilification, patterned labelling, crystallization
of the crisis through a dramatic act, appropriation of the
appropriate social apparatus and suppression of critique, and finally
restoration of a normal situation.</p>

<p>When one considers the development of  electronic media in
society, many of these first elements are in place.  There are many
examples of social stress due to the perceived threat of  new media. 
In addition, the potential for patterned labelling and for
crystallizing degradation ceremonies exist, particularly in
communities which have well defined moral and ethical boundaries.</p>

<p>As was seen in the persecution of the Hollywood 10, the fear of a
particular type of content along with a fear of open access to a
medium may compound the public fear.  Thus, patterned labelling will
begin when defence of a moral boundary leads to vilification for
sending&quot; offensive&quot; electronic messages.</p>

<p>The fact is that much media technology is seen as a positive
development.  In addition, the entrenched power structure, along with
the difficulties in identifying villains, i.e.  cyber punks and the
ability to handle these situations administratively, may mitigate the
potential for the development of mass hate.</p>

</body>

<endnotes>

<endnotetext><num>1</num><p>In this paper I define community in
the broad, non-geographic sense of a group that shares a common
ideology and outlook.  The members of a community have a special
sense of belonging which also means that they have an interest in
maintenance of the communities moral and physical boundaries
(Erikson, 1966: 10).</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>2</num><p>The material on the Norwegian
situation was collected in a series of six focus groups designed to
examine the culture of telephony and the desirability of further
developments in the distribution of visual media.  For a fuller
description of the methods used see Ling (1994).</p></endnotetext>
<endnotetext><num>3</num><p>Erikson describe the trial of Anne
Hutchinson, a ring leader in the so called Antinomian controversy of
17th century Boston, as not so much an examination of guilt or
innocence vis-&Agrave;-vis specific charges but rather&quot; to
invent a name for the nameless offence which Mrs.  Hutchinson had
committed&quot; (1966: 101).  The trial did, however, serve its
purpose as a degradation ceremony for the woman.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>4</num><p>Another example of patterned
labelling is afforded by the so called zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles
in June, 1943 (Cosgrove, 1984; Mazon, 1984).  In this case, the
social strain was the Second World War.  The majority opinion was
that one must sacrifice for the war effort.  By contrast, the
zoot-suiters, who were often either black or Chicano, were seen as
being less willing to volunteer for military service.  In addition,
they wore elaborate suits with trousers extending up under their arm
pits and jackets which reached down to their knees (X, 1973).  Their
perceived lack of willingness to serve the country and the dress
adopted by members of the minority youth culture was a provocation
and allowed for the easy identification of villains.  Those who
supported the war effort showed their loyalty by joining the armed
forces and, on the&quot; home front,&quot; mending old clothes to
save resources.  The result was that the majority community
(particularly members of the military) vilified the zoot-suiters and
attacked them in a series of&quot; riots&quot; (Klapp, 1971; Bergesen
and Warr, 1979).  The military police shared the prejudices of the
enlisted men and turned a blind eye to their activities.  Thus, there
was no event to be reported in the eyes of the authorities and a de
facto appropriation of the social apparatus.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>5</num><p>These included Charles II's order to
allow alternative religions, the establishment of an Anglican church
in Boston-the very church which had been the cause of the Puritans'
exodus-the moves to reduce the role of the Church in public
administration, the French and Indian Wars and the debates regarding
the Charter of the colony.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>6</num><p>To the Puritans witches and the
devil were not abstractions or fairy tale figures.  Much in the same
way that schizophrenia and eating disorders have a tangible reality
to contemporary society, witchcraft and spirits were real in 17th
century Massachusetts (Eisenstein 1991: 434-39).  Thus, witchcraft
could be easily seen as a palpable threat to the community.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>7</num><p>If one supported any of a series of
organizations which were to the left of the political centre in the
US, one could be perceived to be a communist supporter, or at least a
&quot;fellow traveller.&quot;  This included activity in labour
movements and participation in groups supporting the refugees from
the Spanish Civil war.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>8</num><p>Deskilling and surveillance
resulting from technological development can also cause social
strain.  Braverman (1974) and others (Wood, 1987; Wright, 1985) have
written on the relationship between technology and deskilling.  While
Braverman focused on the issue prior to widespread development of
electronic information technology, the tendencies he points to have
only intensified (Evans, 1983; Lamborghini, 1983; Leontief, 1982). 
For many, deskilling poses a threat to one's job.  This in turn
contributes to strain in society.  Another possible social strain is
introduced when one considers the surveillance potential of
interactive electronic media (Meyrowitz, 1986: 321).</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>9</num><p>Physical boundaries mean that one is
able to partition their behaviour.  When in contact with such
disruptive influences one is able to put on an appropriate mask, i.e.
 that of the disgusted community leader or the interested
participant.  Meyrowitz (1966: 50) notes that&quot; the more distance
there is between two situations, the more one can vary in their
behaviour.&quot;  Electronic communication disrupts the possibility
for partitioning.  When&quot; distinct social situations are
combined&quot; the types of behaviour which were appropriate are no
longer so (Meyrowitz, 1966: 4).</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>10</num><p>There have been several episodes
indicating that access to information via electronic media has become
a type of boundary definition issue.  A California couple has been
convicted of sending obscene pictures via the telephone lines to
Tennessee.  The court found that although the photographs may have
been considered acceptable in the community of origin, they broke
with local standards (Fox, 1994).  Cable channel operators in the US
have also began to express concern over censorship associated with
the conservative shift in the US (Multi-channel News, 1994).  Parents
in Norway have expressed concern over access to information on
narcotics and games (Furuly, 1995; Valebrook, 1995).  A Norwegian
television station has been accused of sending an illegal version of
&quot;Mad Max II&quot; (Pedersen, 1995: 32).  Satellite dish antennas
have been banned in Iraq.  Etc.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>11</num><p>Another example includes the case
of Jake Baker, a University of Michigan student who was suspended for
posting sexually violent stories on the Internet.</p></endnotetext>

<endnotetext><num>12</num><p>In fact there was rioting
associated with the apprehension of the boys in the Bulger case.</p></endnotetext>

</endnotes>

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</references>
</ixml>

